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We develop a model of dynamic interactions between price variations in leasing and selling markets for
automobiles. Our framework assumes a differential game between multiple Bertrand-type competing
ﬁrms which offer differentiated products to forward-looking agents. Empirical analysis of our model
using monthly US data from 2002 to 2011 shows that variations in selling (cash) market prices lead rap-
idly dissipating changes of leasing market prices in the opposite direction. We discuss the practical impli-
cations of these results by augmenting a standard leasing valuation formula. The additional terms
represent the leased asset value changes that can be expected on the basis of past variations in automo-
bile selling market prices.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
For households in developed countries the automobile is typi-
cally the second largest asset purchased after a house and is the
most commonly held non-ﬁnancial asset (Aizcorbe et al., 2003).
In the US, one third of all cars sold is ﬁnanced via leasing (e.g.,
see Hendel and Lizzeri, 2002; Johnson and Waldman, 2003) while
a comparable proportion of sales involves cash transactions
(Mannering et al., 2002; Dasgupta et al., 2007). Despite its impor-
tance, the exact association between leasing markets and cash
markets (also known as selling markets) is not yet fully under-
stood. Although some theoretical models exist (see Bulow, 1982,
1986; Bucovetsky and Chilton, 1986; Purohit and Staelin, 1994;
Purohit, 1997; Desai and Purohit, 1998, 1999; Saggi and Vettas,
2000; Huang et al., 2001), they are mostly static in nature and
make the unrealistic assumption of perfect substitutability. More-
over, no study examines the empirical link between leasing and
selling markets for automobiles. The objective of the present paperis to shed further light on this relationship. At a theoretical level,
we make more generic assumptions which permit for dynamic
interactions and imperfect substitutability. At an empirical level,
we use US monthly data to model for the ﬁrst time the dynamic
relationship between leasing and selling market price variations.
Our results motivate us to develop a new dynamic leasing asset
pricing approach for automobiles whereby shocks in selling market
prices are allowed to have a dissipative effect on leasing market
prices and residual values.
In the next section we review the relevant literature. Section 3
lays out our model for describing the interaction between price
variations for automobiles in leasing and selling markets. Section 4,
estimates empirically the model using monthly US CPI data and
discusses the implications of the results for leasing valuation. The
ﬁnal section concludes the paper.2. Literature review
2.1. The relationship between leasing and selling markets
The earliest attempts in understanding the association between
leasing and selling markets originate in the investigation of
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the so-called durable goods monopoly problem (see Coase, 1972;
Stokey, 1981; Bulow, 1982, 1986; Gul et al., 1986; Bucovetsky
and Chilton, 1986; Purohit and Staelin, 1994; Purohit, 1997;
Desai and Purohit, 1998, 1999; Saggi and Vettas, 2000). Most of
these papers assume that leasing and selling are perfect substitutes
with market participants that are indifferent between the two
alternatives. Moreover, the focus of these studies is to investigate
the conditions under which leasing is the optimal strategy in the
context of different market structures. A related strand of literature
examines the relationship between the markets for new and used
automobiles. From a static perspective, Bresnahan (1981), Berry
et al. (1995), Goldberg (1995) and Petrin (2002) gauge the market
power of introducing new products in the automobile industry.
However, as argued by Blanchard and Melino (1986) it is important
to employ a dynamic approach for at least two reasons which are
discussed below. First, dynamics may arise in durable goods mod-
els of two interacting markets where used cars constitute stock
variables which are imperfect substitutes to new cars. For example,
Berkovec (1985) uses the econometric estimates of a short-run
model to forecast sales and other automobile industry variables.
Rust (1985, 1986) concentrates on dynamic consumer demand in
durable goods with new, used and scrappage markets for automo-
biles. Transaction costs in a dynamic setting are considered by
Konishi and Sandfort (2002), Stolyarov (2002) and Schiraldi
(2011). Esteban and Shum (2007) model the production decision
of a ﬁrm in a discrete dynamic oligopoly setting in which automo-
bile prices are endogenously determined. Adda and Cooper (2000a)
build a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of car ownership
at the individual level in order to study the output and public
ﬁnance effects of subsidies on automobile demand. Eberly (1994)
and Attanasio (2000) study (S, s) models of household automobile
demand with transaction costs and liquidity constraints. Second,
forward-looking dynamics may arise also in the demand side of
the durable goods market on the basis of consumer expectations
of future prices for new cars. In this case consumers are not myopic
towards the future since they consider their expected utility while
making their primary decisions on if and when to buy. Chen et al.
(2008, 2010) construct a calibrated equilibrium time consistent
dynamic oligopoly model of a durable goods market, which incor-
porates both the sources of dynamics mentioned previously. In
particular, Chen et al. (2008) ignore the dynamics by evaluating
the bias in estimating the structural parameters of a static model.
Chen et al. (2010) incorporate transaction costs in the used market
which makes purchases important on the demand side.
A prominent issue in the durable goods markets is the possibil-
ity of oscillatory behavior. Sobel (1991) and Conlisk et al. (1984)
consider a new group of consumers, with a heterogeneity of tastes,
which enters the market sequentially and leads the monopolist to
ﬂuctuate the equilibrium price periodically (Sobel, 1984, studies
the same problem in an oligopoly setting). Board (2008) considers
the pricing behavior of a durable goods monopolist for a new good
where agents can strategically time their purchases and where the
demand ﬂuctuates exogenously over time. Janssen and
Karamychev (2002) allow for information asymmetry in a dynamic
competitive model of identical generations entering the market
over time. Caplin and Leahy (2006) develop an (S, s) model of oscil-
lations in demand which reﬂects ﬂuctuations in the number of
consumers who purchase the durable goods as well as of variations
in the demand of a single consumer. They use this model to analyze
the equilibrium dynamics of prices, the number of purchases and
the size of purchases of the durable goods. Empirical evidence by
Bils and Klenow (1998) conﬁrms that durable goods prices have
a tendency to move procyclically relative to prices of nondurable
goods. Blanchard and Melino (1986) construct a competitive equi-
librium model with representative consumers and ﬁrms. Theirintention is to understand the common cyclical behavior of prices
and quantities in a certain market for automobiles. Finally, Adda
and Cooper (2000b) concentrate on the demand side and estimate
a VAR(1) model of aggregate income, relative prices of cars and
consumer preference shocks. They report that the impulse
response function exhibits dampened oscillations in response to
an income shock. This is explained on the basis of two reasons.
First, due to non-convex adjustment costs with heterogeneous
consumers, the endogenous growth of the stock of cars can gener-
ate replacement cycles and subsequent oscillations in sales. Sec-
ond, the oscillations can arise from the serial correlation in
income and prices.2.2. Automobile leasing and selling market structure
The literature identiﬁes and studies different ways in which the
market for durable goods can be organized. One strand argues that
the optimal strategy for a durable goods ﬁrm is to try and operate
in a balanced manner in both the selling and leasing market (see
Bulow, 1986; Desai and Purohit, 1998, 1999; Saggi and Vettas,
2000; Huang et al., 2001; Hendel and Lizzeri, 2002; Bhaskaran
and Gilbert, 2005, 2009). In this setting leasing ﬁrms function as
subsidiaries of manufacturers as, for example, General Motors
Lease and Ford Credit Lease. In another setup, which is relevant
to the standard consumer lease agreement framework, the lessor
is a ﬁnancial institution which buys on behalf of the lessee a new
vehicle from a licensed automobile dealer and then leases it to a
lessee (Myers et al., 1976; Giaccotto et al., 2007). Since the core
business of the lessor, which is usually a retail bank or a personal
ﬁnance company, does not involve selling used cars, the leased car
is sold through the wholesale used car market. In this way, the les-
sor is neither a manufacturer nor a dealer of automobiles.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) argue that ﬁrms do not operate
businesses in both leasing and selling spheres. This is because in
line with what practitioners argue, the possibility of the lessors
to take back an asset allows them to implicitly expand more credit
than lenders whose claims are protected by the same asset.
Dasgupta et al. (2007) describe the elements of typical dealer
ﬁnancing contracts and leasing contracts and how these differ.
The dealer ﬁnancing contract can be described by the base price
of the vehicle, the annual percentage rate, the payment period
(or term) and cash rebates. The alternative is leasing, which entails
ﬁnancing the user cost of the vehicle rather than its entire pur-
chase price. Consequently, leasing has lower down- and
monthly-payments. Lease payments could be as low as one third
of those required to buy the car. This makes leasing an attractive
choice for credit constrained consumers and also allows them to
acquire more luxurious cars. In terms of popularity, Dasgupta
et al. (2007) report that 24.2% of the transactions were leased,
35% of the sales were dealer-ﬁnanced, while the remaining 40.8%
were categorized as ‘‘cash’’ transactions (most likely these were
ﬁnanced elsewhere rather than being actually paid for by cash).
Another interesting case is the separate channel described by
Purohit (1997). This characterizes the state of the industry in
which rental agencies and dealers are licensed solely to rent and
to sell cars, respectively, and compete between them. Finally, there
are also the third-party independent lessors, which are neither
banks nor dealers (Myers et al., 1976; Giaccotto et al., 2007;
Bhaskaran and Gilbert, 2009).3. Model formulation
In this section we build a framework for modeling in a dynamic
manner the interaction between leasing and selling market prices
for automobiles. Such a dynamic setting has been studied
2 Since the seller has already chosen PKj ;t1 in the previous period, the assumption
of choosing RKj ;t is equivalent to the assumption of choosing PKj ;t .
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construct a dynamic monopoly model of leasing, selling and used
goods markets, respectively, with ﬁnite duration under an inﬁnite
time horizon and nontrivial transaction costs. Although our
approach does not consider transaction costs and used goods, we
assume a more realistic oligopoly setting. So, for the ﬁrst time
we study a dynamic oligopoly model of leasing and selling in
which leases and loans are imperfect substitutes. Although, our
model of the leasing market is not the ﬁrst dynamic model, it is
the ﬁrst dynamic oligopoly model of the leasing market. Our
approach is also closely related to that of Esteban and Shum
(2007) although they concentrate on modeling the interaction
between new and used car markets. We also differ from Esteban
and Shum (2007) in the focus of our models. Speciﬁcally, they
assume a discrete time approach and analyze the stage in which
ﬁrms determine the new car designs. Our continuous time model
deals with the stage in which producers set prices conditional on
product types. This distinction makes the model of Esteban and
Shum (2007) backward looking, since the production choices of
the ﬁrm today depend on cars produced in the past. In our setting,
ﬁrms are forward looking since their price choices depend on the
future.
Another important characteristic of our approach is that unlike
most of the previous literature it does not treat selling and leasing
of automobiles as perfect substitutes. As pointed out by Dasgupta
et al. (2007), the assumption of substitutability is unrealistic for
at least three reasons. First, automobile leasing contracts differ sig-
niﬁcantly from selling contracts in that the former typically com-
prise of several terms and conditions, such as the price, the
interest rate, the installment and the maturity of the contract. Sec-
ond, differences in the discount factor used by consumers can also
lead to differences in the evaluation of leasing versus selling deci-
sions. Third, in the case of leasing the decision also involves non-
ﬁnancial clauses related to, for example, operating and mainte-
nance costs.
As discussed in the previous section, following Myers et al.
(1976), Giaccotto et al. (2007), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009),
Purohit (1997) and Dasgupta et al. (2007), we assume the follow-
ing channel structure at the retailer level: The lessor (which can
be a bank, a ﬁnance company or a third-party independent lessor)
purchases the automobiles from the manufacturer and then leases
them out to clients. The automobile dealer or seller, we use these
terms interchangeably, also buys the automobiles from the manu-
facturer but then sells them to clients either through loans or a
cash transaction.
3.1. General case
For simplicity, we assume a market with a ﬁxed number of n
lessors and m sellers of automobiles which offer differentiated ser-
vices in each market, respectively. Following Miller and Upton
(1976) and Agarwal et al. (2011), we further assume that the rep-
resentative ﬁrms have as control variables the rates and not the
prices of their products, emphasizing in this way the ﬁnancial
aspect of the lease contracts. Finally, we also assume that leasing
services are differentiated from selling services. So, the representa-
tive lessor (seller) in every period competes with the other lessors
(sellers)-within market competition, and at the same time with the
sellers (lessors) in the other market-between markets competition.
As argued by Dudine et al. (2006), the dynamic demand is dri-
ven by both the durability of the product and by the anticipation
of consumers for the future prices. However, in the present setting,
as Chen et al. (2008), we assume for simplicity that the consumer
decisions whether to buy an automobile depend on their expecta-
tions about future market prices which create forward-looking
dynamics in the demand function, and, subsequently in the deci-sions of the ﬁrms. In this manner, the demand depends on the cur-
rent rate level as well as on its time derivative.
As Goldberg (1995), we focus on the second stage of a two stage
game. Speciﬁcally, since the market is an oligopoly with differenti-
ated products, the supply decisions and the market equilibria
involve two stages. First, a long-run stage, in which ﬁrms deter-
mine the product-mix and the quality of their products, and, sec-
ond, a short-run stage in which producers set prices given their
product types. Since automobiles are durable goods, the represen-
tative lessor, faces the following intertemporal problem:
max
RLi ðtÞ
R1
0 e
qtðRLi ðtÞ  cLi ÞqLi ðtÞdt
s:t: qLi ðRLi ðtÞ;RLi ðtÞ;RkðtÞ; _RLi ðtÞ; _RLi ðtÞ; _RkðtÞÞ
ð1Þ
The representative seller faces the following problem:
max
Rkj ðtÞ
R1
0 e
qtðRkj ðtÞ  ckj Þqkj ðtÞdt
s:t: qkj ðRkj ðtÞ;Rkj ðtÞ;RLðtÞ; _Rkj ðtÞ; _Rkj ðtÞ; _RLðtÞÞ
ð2Þ
where Ri(t) is the rate of ﬁrm i at time t and the subscripts L and k
denote leasing and selling, respectively; RLi ðtÞ and Rkj ðtÞ are the
vectors of lease and sell rates of lessor’s i, sellers j, ‘‘within’’ rivals.
In other words, the vector RLi ðtÞ is the vector of all the lease rates
other than the lease rate of ﬁrm i, and the vector Rkj ðtÞ is the vector
of all the sell rates other than the sell rate of ﬁrm j. So,
RLi ðtÞ ¼
RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
RLi1 ðtÞ
RLIþ1 ðtÞ
..
.
RLnðtÞ
2666666666664
3777777777775
;Rkj ðtÞ ¼
Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
Rkj1 ðtÞ
Rkjþ1 ðtÞ
..
.
Rkm ðtÞ
2666666666664
3777777777775
..
.
where RL(t), Rk(t) are the vectors of lease and sell rates, ‘‘between’’
rivals, respectively. With dots denoting time-derivatives we have:
_RLi ðtÞ ¼
_RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
_RLi1 ðtÞ
_RLIþ1 ðtÞ
..
.
_RLnðtÞ
2666666666664
3777777777775
; _Rkj ðtÞ ¼
_Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
_Rkj1 ðtÞ
_Rkjþ1 ðtÞ
..
.
_Rkm ðtÞ
26666666666664
37777777777775
where ci is the opportunity cost of capital (WACC) of ﬁrm i. In order
to maximize his proﬁts the representative lessor chooses the
instantaneous lease rate RLi ðtÞ ¼
dPLi
PLi
¼ LiðtÞPLi ðtÞ, or, in discrete time
RLi ðtÞ ¼
DPLi
PLi;t1
¼ PLi;tPLi;t1PLi;t1 . Li(t) is the default free lease payment paid
at the beginning of the period; PLi ðtÞ and Pkj ðtÞ represent the leased
and the purchased asset prices set from i lessor and j seller, respec-
tively, at the beginning of period. As with the lessor, the represen-
tative seller chooses the instantaneous sell rate, Rkj ðtÞ ¼
dPkj
Pkj
, or,
Rkj ðtÞ ¼
DPkj
Pkj;t1
¼ Pkj;tPkj;t1Pkj;t1 in order to maximize proﬁts.
2
In line with Goldberg (1995), ﬁrms are assumed to be free of
quantity constraints while attempting to maximize the present
value of proﬁts between consecutive market periods. They use
the same discount factor eqt e (0,1), where q denotes the common
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q ¼ cLi ¼ ckj for all ﬁrms. Finally, the demand functions are linear
and set equal to3:
qLi ðtÞ ¼ h0 þ hLiRLi ðtÞ þ hLi RLi ðtÞ þ hkjRkj ðtÞ þ hkj Rkj ðtÞ þ h _Li _RLi ðtÞ
þ h _Li _RLi ðtÞ þ h _kj _Rkj ðtÞ þ h _kj _Rkj ðtÞ
qkj ðtÞ ¼ k0 þ kLi RLi ðtÞ þ kLi RLi ðtÞ þ kkjRkj ðtÞ þ kkj Rkj ðtÞ
þ k _Li _RLi ðtÞ þ k _Li _RLi ðtÞ þ k _kj _Rkj ðtÞ þ k _kj _Rkj ðtÞ ð3Þ
We now discuss the parameters of the above demand functions,
by organizing them into ﬁve sets:
1. The parameters h0; k0 are the intercepts and they are always
positive. hLi and kkj are the slopes of the demand curves and they
are always negative since the demand for the speciﬁc good is
downward sloping in its own rate. A demand curve with only
these two parameters is a standard demand curve.
2. hLi ¼ ½hL1 ; . . . ; hLi1 ; hLiþ1 ; . . . ; hLn  is the vector of the coefﬁcients
of all the lease rates other than the lease rate of ﬁrm i. It reﬂects
the extent to which the lease contract of lease ﬁrm i is a substi-
tute of the lease contract of lease ﬁrm s– i. The vector
kkj ¼ ½kk1 ; . . . ; kkj1 ; kkjþ1 ; . . . ; kkm  has a similar interpretation
and contains the coefﬁcients of all the sell rates other than
the sell rate of ﬁrm j. As for selling contracts, we expect the
coefﬁcients in both vectors to be positive since the lease con-
tracts are substitutes.
3. The demand structure at hand allows a range of different
degrees of substitutability between the contracts. The coefﬁ-
cient hki reﬂects the impact of the sell rates of seller j on the
quantity of lease contracts of lessor i. The vector of coefﬁcients
hkj ¼ ½hk1 ; . . . ; hkj1 ; hkjþ1 ; . . . ; hkm  reﬂects the impact of the sell
rates of the sellers other than j, on the quantity of lease con-
tracts of lessor i. The interpretation is similar for the coefﬁcient
kLi and the vector of coefﬁcients kLi ¼ ½kL1 ; . . . ; kLi1 ; kLiþ1 ; . . . ; kLn 
they reﬂect the impact of the lease rates on the quantity of the
sell contracts of seller j. In general, we consider that selling and
leasing are substitutes when hkj ; hkj ; kLi ; kLi > 0, while they are
complements when hkj ; hkj ; kLi ; kLi < 0. However, as recently
discussed by De Jaegher (2009), the above deﬁnitions refer spe-
ciﬁcally to weak symmetric gross substitutes and weak sym-
metric gross complements, respectively. In general, the
deﬁnition of substitutability and complementarity requires that
not only the signs but also the absolute values of the coefﬁ-
cients hkj ; hkj ; kLi ; kLi are the same. De Jaegher considers the
case when hkj ; hkj ; kLi ; kLi have opposite signs in which two
goods are strong asymmetric substitutes. In our setting, selling
would be a substitute for leasing and leasing would be a com-
plement to selling, or, vice versa. If, for example, hkj ; hkj < 0
and kLi ; kLi > 0 then the demand for leasing is a decreasing
function of the purchase rate so leasing is a gross substitute
of purchasing. At the same time, the demand for purchasing is
an increasing function of lease rate so that purchasing is a gross
complement of leasing.
4. Speciﬁcation of h _Li ; h _Li ; k _kj and k _kj depends on expectations. In
our model, consumers form expectations in a perfect foresight
manner according to dR
e
dt ¼ dRdt , the time-derivative of the speciﬁc
rate. This constitutes the deterministic equivalent of the rational
expectation hypothesis and allows us to avoid complications
related to adverse selection (see Akerlof, 1970; Hendel and
Lizzeri, 1999). The coefﬁcient h _Li reﬂects the impact of the expec-3 The linear demand structure arises from a quadratic and strictly concave utility
function (see Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 1984).tations for lease rate i on the quantity of lease contracts of lessor i,
and the vector of timederivatives h _Li ¼ ½h _L1 ; . . . ; h _Li1 ; h _Liþ1 ; . . . ; h _Ln 
gives the coefﬁcientswhich reﬂect the impact of the expectations
for the other lease rates, other than the lease rate of ﬁrm i, on the
quantity of lease contracts of lessor i. The interpretation is similar
for the coefﬁcient k _kj and the vector of coefﬁcients
k _kj ¼ ½k _k1 ; . . . ; k _kj1 ; k _kjþ1 ; . . . ; k _km : they reﬂect the impact of the
expectations for the lease rates on the quantity of the sell con-
tracts of seller j. If consumersexpect rates to continue rising, their
desire to holdmoney is reduced so h _Li ; h _Li ; k _kj and k _kj will beposi-
tive. However, if they expect that rates will continue falling, then
they restrain frombuying and h _Li ; h _Li ; k _kj and k _kj will be negative.
5. Finally, the interpretation of the signs for h _kj ; h _kj ; k _Li , and k _Li
will depend on the substitutability of selling and leasing. More
speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcient h _kj reﬂects the impact of the expec-
tations for sell rate j on the quantity of lease contracts of lessor
i. The vector of time derivatives h _kj ¼ ½h _k1 ; . . . ; h _kj1 ; h _kjþ1 ; . . . ; h _km 
gives the coefﬁcients which reﬂect the impact of the expecta-
tions for the other sell rates, other than the sell rate of ﬁrm j,
on the quantity of lease contracts of lessor i. The interpretation
is similar for the coefﬁcient k _Li and the vector of coefﬁcients
k _Li ¼ ½k _L1 ; . . . ; k _Li1 ; k _Liþ1 ; . . . ; k _Ln : they reﬂect the impact of the
expectations for the lease rates on the quantity of the sell con-
tracts of seller j. For example, when they are substitutes, if con-
sumers expect that the sell rate will continue rising then they
increase their demand now. Assuming constant supply, this
leads to a rise in sell rates which in turn increases the demand
for leasing services. In this case, h _kj ; h _kj are positive. Conversely,
if consumers expect sell rates to fall then h _kj ; h _kj will be nega-
tive. A similar line of arguments can be made in interpreting
the signs of k _Li ; k _Li .
The ﬁrst order conditions are obtained by substituting the
demand functions into the objective functions and then solving
the maximization problems using the calculus of variations tech-
nique. More speciﬁcally, lessor’s i and seller’s j problems for
dynamic optimization must satisfy the Euler equation according
to the following proposition (the general conditions that the rate
functions must satisfy for the calculus of variations technique to
be valid and a detailed derivation of the ﬁrst-order optimization
conditions are given in Appendix A):
Proposition. (a) Representative lessor’s i Euler equation is the
following:
eqtqLi ðtÞþ eqtðRLi ðtÞqÞhLi ¼qeqtðRLi ðtÞqÞh _Li ; 8i¼ 1;2; . . . ;n
(b) Representative seller’s j Euler equation is the following:
eqtqkj ðtÞþeqtðRkj ðtÞqÞkkj ¼qeqtðRkj ðtÞqÞk _kj ; 8j¼1;2; . . . ;m
The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimization problems underhand
in matrix form, which correspond to the best response functions, are
the following:
1 . . . a _k1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
b _Lm1 . . . 1
2664
3775
_RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
_RLnðtÞ
_Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
_Rkm ðtÞ
2666666666664
3777777777775
þ
aL11 . . . ak1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
bLm1 . . . bLmm
2664
3775
RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
RLn ðtÞ
Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
Rkm ðtÞ
266666666664
377777777775
¼
aL1
..
.
aLn
bk1
..
.
bkm
266666666664
377777777775
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a _Lij 
h _Lj
h _Li
; a _kij 
h _kj
h _Li
; aLii 
2hLi þ qh _Li
h _Li
;
aLij ;i–j 
hLj
h _Li
; akij 
hkj
h _Li
and aLi 
ðhLi þ qh _Li Þq h0
h _Li
b _kij 
k _ki
k _kj
; b _Lij 
k _Lj
k _kj
; bkjj 
2kkj þ qk _kj
kkj
;
bkij ;i–j 
k _ki
k _kj
; bLij 
kLi
k _kj
and bkj 
ðkkj þ qk _kj Þq k0
k _kj
ð4Þ
The obtained system has n + m equations and n + m unknowns and it is
linear. Therefore, it has a unique solution, as long as the matrix
1 . . . a _k1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
b _Lm1 . . . 1
264
375 is not singular. If this matrix is singular then the sys-
tem has either inﬁnite number of solutions or no solution. This general
system of ﬁrst order differential equations is not in normal form. We
can reduce it to an equivalent ﬁrst order system in normal form by
assuming that the above matrix is not singular, as following:
_RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
_RLnðtÞ
_Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
_Rkm ðtÞ
2666666666664
3777777777775
¼ 
1 . . . a _k1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
b _Lm1 . . . 1
2664
3775
1
aL11 . . . ak1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
bLm1 . . . 1
2664
3775
RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
RLnðtÞ
Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
Rkm ðtÞ
266666666664
377777777775
þ
1 . . . a _k1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
b _Lm1 . . . 1
2664
3775
1
aL1
..
.
aLn
bk1
..
.
bkm
266666666664
377777777775
or,
_RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
_RLnðtÞ
_Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
_Rkm ðtÞ
2666666666664
3777777777775
¼
l1;1 . . . l1;nþm
..
. . .
. ..
.
lnþm;1 . . . lnþm;nþm
2664
3775
RL1 ðtÞ
..
.
RLn ðtÞ
Rk1 ðtÞ
..
.
Rkm ðtÞ
266666666664
377777777775
þ
M1
..
.
Mn
Mnþ1
..
.
Mnþm
266666666664
377777777775
ð5Þ
By setting,
l1;1 . . . l1;nþm
..
. . .
. ..
.
lnþm;1 . . . lnþm;nþm
2664
3775 ¼
1 . . . a _k1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
b _Lm1 . . . 1
2664
3775
1
aL11 . . . ak1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
bLm1 . . . 1
2664
3775
and
M1
..
.
Mn
Mnþ1
..
.
Mnþm
266666666664
377777777775
¼
1 . . . a _k1m
..
. . .
. ..
.
b _Lm1 . . . 1
2664
3775
1
aL1
..
.
aLn
bk1
..
.
bkm
266666666664
377777777775The above system gives the ﬁrst time derivatives of the rates of return
for each of the n lessors and m sellers in the market as a linear combi-
nation of their rates of return.3.2. Symmetric equilibrium case
The general problem is not easily tractable. For example, if we
have a leasing market with n = 7 lessors, and a selling market with
m = 5 sellers, then we have to deal with a linear system of 12 linear
differential equations. So, for practical reasons we focus our atten-
tion on the case of symmetric equilibrium in which all leasing
ﬁrms charge the same rate and, all the selling ﬁrms as well. In
the symmetric equilibrium we assume that there is no ‘‘within’’
market competition. In other words, we assume that all the leasing
ﬁrms follow the same price strategy as do the selling ﬁrms. So,
under the symmetric equilibrium we end up with the following
system of differential equations in matrix form (the detailed deri-
vation of the symmetric equilibrium is given in Appendix B):
1 mn a _k
n
m b _L 1
" #
_RLðtÞ
_RkðtÞ
" #
þ aLL
m
n akk
n
m bLL bkk
" #
RLðtÞ
RkðtÞ
 
¼
1
n aL
1
m bk
" #
where
aLL  ðnþ 1ÞhL þ qh _Lnh _L
; akk  hkh _L
bLL  kkk _k
; bkk 
ðmþ 1Þkk þ qk _k
mk _k
ð6Þ
This can be reduced to an equivalent ﬁrst order system in normal
form as following:
_RLðtÞ
_RkðtÞ
" #
¼ 1
m
n a _k
n
m b _L 1
" #1
aLL mn akk
n
m bLL bkk
" #
RLðtÞ
RkðtÞ
 
þ 1
m
n a _k
n
m b _L 1
" #1 1
n aL
1
mbk
" #
This assumes that the matrix
1 mn a _k
n
m b _L 1
 
is not singular, i.e., that:
1 a _kb _L ¼ 1
h _k
h _L
k _L
k _k
–0
Finally, we obtain the following system of differential equations in
normal form (the explicit solution of Eq. (7) is given in Appendix C):
_RLðtÞ ¼ K1 þu11RLðtÞ þu12RkðtÞ
_RkðtÞ ¼ K2 þu21RLðtÞ þu22RkðtÞ
ð7Þ
where
K1 
1
n aL  nm2 b _Lbk
1 a _kb _L
; K2 
1
m bk  mn2 a _kaL
1 a _kb _L
and
u11 
n2
m2 b _LbLL  aLL
1 a _kb _L
; u12 
n
m b _Lbkk  mn akk
1 a _kb _L
u21 
m
n a _kaLL  nm bLL
1 a _kb _L
; u22 
m2
n2 a _kakk  bkk
1 a _kb _L
ð8Þ
In the above system the two rates of return interact with each other
linearly since their ﬁrst time derivatives are proportional to a linear
combination of their levels. The values of the coefﬁcients uij deter-
mine the contribution that the levels of the variables make to their
growth. Speciﬁcally, u12 and u21 relate the growth of the return of
one variable to the level of return of the other variable. So, a nega-
tive value of u12 indicates the negative contribution of the level of
the sell rate to the growth of the lease rate, in the sense that the
Table 1
Equilibrium points for the linear system derived in the symmetric equilibrium.
Market trend Interaction effect Discriminant Roots Determinant Equilibrium
point
Stability
u11 = u22 u12, u21 are both different than
zero and have the same sign
D > 0 Real,
distinct
u11u22 > u12u21 det(U)>0 Node Stable if tr(U) < 0
Unstable if tr(U) > 0
u11– u22, and at
least one non-
zero
(u11  u22)2 > |4u12u21| and
u12, u21 have the opposite sign
D > 0 Real,
distinct
u11u22 < u12u21 det(U)<0 Saddle Point Conditional stability,
depends on initial
conditions
u11 = u22 = 0, or
u11 = u22,
u12, u21 have opposite sign D < 0 Pure
imaginary
Centre
u11– u22, and at
least one non-
zero
(u11  u22)2 < |4u12u21| and
u12, u21 have opposite sign
D < 0 Complex
conjugate
Focus Stable if tr(U) < 0
Unstable if tr(U) > 0
u11– u22, and at
least one non-
zero
(u11  u22)2 = 4u12u21 and
u12, u21 have opposite sign
D = 0 Real and
Equal
Node Stable if tr(U) < 0
u11 = u22 u12, u21 = 0 and at least one non-
zero
D = 0 Real and
Equal
Unstable if tr(U) > 0
4
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words, if consumers cannot buy the good then the rate of growth
for the return of leasing will be higher. In this way, a negative value
of u12 reduces the power of the leasing ﬁrms in the market. Coefﬁ-
cients u11 and u22 indicate the effect of the level of return on its
own rate of growth. The characteristic polynomial of the system’s
matrix U ¼ u11 u12u21 u22
 
can be written as u2  (u11 + u22)u +
(u11u22  u12u21) = 0. The signs of the coefﬁcients, uii and uij
allow us to classify the dynamics of the two interacting markets
in four interesting cases (summarized in Table 1):
Case 1. Stable node
Arises when D = tr(U)2  4 det (U) > 0 where tr(U) = u1 +
u2 < 0 and det (U) = u1u2 > 0. There are two ways in which the
trace can be negative. First, u11, u22 are both negative. This means
that we have a declining trend in each of the two markets. For
instance, an increase in the lease rate RL(t) has an inverse impact
on the growth of both RL(t) and Rk(t) since the derivatives
_RLðtÞ; _RkðtÞ are negative. Second, either one of u11, u22 is negative
while the other is positive with the negative being higher in abso-
lute value. Although there is a declining trend within only one
market, the level of decline is high enough to compensate for any
growth trend in the returns of the other market. In other words,
the decline is present only in one market but it is large enough
to lead both markets towards their steady-state rates of returns.
As an example, suppose that there is a declining trend in the leas-
ing market, i.e., u11 < 0, while in the selling market returns are
increasing, i.e.,u22 > 0. For the determinant to be positive, the term
u12,u21 must be positive since u11u22 is negative. So, u12,u21
must have opposite signs. This means that one market beneﬁts
from the growth of the other although, at the same time, it dam-
ages its growth. When real roots are positive,u1,u2 > 0 an unstable
node arises. The returns in both markets arise indeﬁnitely and sys-
tem deviates from its steady state. So in order to exclude the pos-
sibility of a bubble in the markets we require that the real roots are
negative.
Case 2. Saddle point
Arises only when D = tr(U)2  4 det (U) > 0 and det
(U) =u1u2 < 0. This means that the interaction effect u12u21 is
positive and greater than the product u11u22 and can be realized
in two different ways. First, if the one market beneﬁts the
other, u12 > 0, u21 > 0 and this beneﬁt dominates the system
dynamics. In this manner, the interaction effect overcomes the
positive combined effect, u11u22. Second, if the combined effect
u11u22 is negative, i.e., there is a declining trend within onemarket and growth in the other making the interaction effect
nonnegative.
Case 3. Focus
Arises when D = tr(U)2  4 det (U) = (u11  u22)2 + 4u12u21 < 0
and tr(U) = u1 + u2– 0. The negative discriminant means that the
term 4u12u21 is negative and exceeds in absolute value the term
(u11  u22)2. Consequently, u12, u21 must have opposite signs.
Such a situation may arise if, for example, the leasing market ben-
eﬁts from its interaction with the selling market, i.e., u12 > 0, while
the selling market is damaged by its interaction with the leasing
market, i.e., u21 < 0, and in the leasing market there is a declining
trend (u11 < 0) while the selling market is growing (u22 > 0). If the
discriminant is equal to zero, the interpretation is similar but the
interaction of the markets follows a node rather than a focus equi-
librium. In order to exclude the possibility of instability and bub-
bles we require that the real parts of the roots are negative and
the trace is negative in the case of the focus and node, respectively.
Case 4. Centre
Arises when D = tr(U)2  4 det (U) < 0 and tr(U) = u1 + u2 = 0.
The negative discriminant is explained as in the previous case
and the trace condition can occur in two ways. First,
u11 =u22 = 0, i.e., there is no trend in the rates of returns in both
markets. Second, u11 = u22, i.e., the intensity of the decline in
the one market is equal and opposite to that of the growth in the
other market.
4. Empirical application
4.1. A model of dynamic interaction between leasing and selling
markets
Our sample is drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
database and corresponds to the US which is the largest automo-
bile market internationally. The period covered is January 2002–
May 2011, a total of 113 monthly observations expressed in
constant prices of December 2001.4 Two city-average Consumer Price
Indices (CPI) are used which correspond to seasonally adjusted price
levels of New Cars and Trucks (NEW) and Leased Cars and Trucks
(LEAS). The later is a component of the new and used motor vehicles
expenditure class, which is part of the CPI’s private transportation
component in the transportation major group and it covers leases
on all classes of new consumer vehicles. The CPI data collector
describes each selected vehicle lease in detail including sevenThe discussion closely follows Labor/Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov.
Table 2
Stationarity analysis of automobile selling prices (NEW) and leasing prices (LEAS).
Method Test statistic p-Value
H0: Common unit root process
Levin et al. (2002) t* 0.4818 0.6850
H0: Individual unit root process
Im et al. (2003) W-stat 0.0392 0.4844
Maddala and Wu (1999), ADF Fisher Chi-square 3.0436 0.5506
Choi (2001) PP Fisher Chi-square 3.7628 0.4391
Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distri-
bution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of monthly changes in automobile selling prices (RNEW) and
leasing prices (RLEAS).
RNEW RLEAS
Mean 0.0001 0.0004
Median 0.0000 0.0011
Maximum 0.0153 0.0367
Minimum 0.0115 0.0232
Std. Dev. 0.0042 0.0081
Skewness 0.3726 1.1606
Kurtosis 4.5428 7.3385
Jarque–Bera 13.6990 112.9836
p-Value 0.0011 0.0000
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engine, transmission, options and lease terms. The lease terms
include characteristics such as the number of months of the lease
term, the down payment, the residual value, the depreciation
amount and the total rent charge. The sample is updated by one
model year each September through November in order to maintain
the same age vehicles over time. If a production model is discontin-
ued, it is replaced by a comparable model. A complete resampling is
scheduled every 5 years. Finance charges are not included in the CPI
as well as any incentives associated with low-interest ﬁnancing, are
excluded from the discount or rebate amount.5 The value that the
CPI uses in LEAS is an estimated transaction price that reﬂects the
vehicle base price, destination charge, options, dealer preparation
charges, applicable taxes, depreciation, and lease rent charge (the
ﬁnance fee portion of a monthly lease payment, similar to interest
on a loan). The estimated transaction price also includes the respon-
dent’s estimate for the price markup, dealer concession or discount,
and consumer rebate.
A casual inspection of the CPI levels suggests some kind of
inverse co-evolution between the two series under study along
with a smooth variation which is consistent with nonstationarity.
As shown in Table 2, panel stationarity tests of CPI levels assuming
a common or separate unit root processes conﬁrm that both NEW
and LEAS are integrated. Cointegration analysis suggests that no
long term equilibrium relationship exists between the levels of
the two CPI series (results are available upon request by the
authors). So, CPI levels are used to calculate monthly rates of
returns for selling (RNEW) and leasing (RLEAS), respectively, as
simple percentage changes and these are then used in the subse-
quent analysis. Stationarity tests show that RNEW and RLEAS are
I(0) indicating that the original series is I(1).
Descriptive statistics of the returns appear in Table 3. The
results suggest that both series are positively skewed and lep-
tokurtic. The maximum positive (negative) change was 1.53% or
3.64 standard deviations (1.15% or 2.74 s.d.) for RNEW and
occurred during the recent crisis period on October 2009 (March
2008). Similarly, for RLEAS the maximum (minimum) was 3.67%
or 4.5 s.d. (2.32% or 2.86 s.d.) on February 2009 (June 2009).
The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient between the two return series5 The formation of the Leased cars and trucks index is based on the calculation of
total monthly lease payment. The formula, which uses the U.S. Department of Labor/
Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the calculation of total monthly lease payment is the
following: Total Monthly Lease Payment = (Base Price of Leased Vehicle) + (Trans-
portation to Dealer) + (Total Price of Packages & Options) + (Dealer Preparation and
Miscellaneous Charges) + (Additional Dealer Markup)  (Dealer Concession or Dis-
count), which is equal with: (Capitalized Cost) (similar to the purchase price of a
vehicle)  (Down payment)  (Rebate)  (Other Capitalized Cost Reduc-
tions) + (Tax) + (Other Additions to Capitalized Cost), which in turn is equal with:
(Adjusted Capitalized Cost, amount used to calculate base monthly pay-
ment)  (Residual Value, value of the vehicle at the end of the lease) and this is
equal with: (Depreciation Amount, the total amount charged for the decline in
value) + (Total Lease Rent Charge, the ﬁnance fee, similar to interest), which ﬁnally
equals with: (Total of Base Monthly Payments/Lease Term, the number of months in
the lease), or (Base Monthly Payment) + (Monthly Sales/Use Tax).is 10.84% which is statistically insigniﬁcant at the 10% level and
suggests no contemporaneous relationship. However, the null
hypothesis that DNEW does not Granger-cause DLEAS is rejected
with a test F-statistic of 6.0358 for 1 lag which is signiﬁcant at
the 1.56% level. The hypothesis in the opposite direction cannot
be rejected at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
The general system of differential Eq. (5) of our model can be
written in discrete time in order to be estimable. It corresponds
to a n +m variable VAR of lag order one as our theory dictates in
reduced form.6 However, its estimation needs the rates of return
charged by all the leasing ﬁrms and all the selling ﬁrms. So, due to
data limitations, we express in discrete time the symmetric solution
characterized by system (7) as following:
RL;tþ1 ¼ K1 þ b11RL;t þu12Rk;t þ uL;tþ1
Rk;tþ1 ¼ K1 þu21RL;t þ b22Rk;t þ uj;tþ1
ð9Þ
where b11  (1 + u11) and b22  (1 + u22). This is a again a VAR of
lag order one in reduced form. Estimation of this VAR model via
OLS and subsequent elimination of the insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients
led to the following results (standard errors appear in brackets
below estimates):
RL;tþ1 ¼ 0:2643ð0:0901Þ RL;t  0:4408ð0:1790Þ Rk;t þ uL;tþ1;R
2
adj ¼ 0:124Rk;tþ1 ¼ 0:3978ð0:0888Þ Rk;t þ uk;tþ1;R
2
adj ¼ 0:153
The estimated coefﬁcients allow us to draw several interesting con-
clusions. It appears that leasing market price changes are inversely
related to prices changes in the selling market from the previous
month (u12 < 0). From a biological perspective, this is characterized
as a ‘‘predatory’’ relationship of selling market over the leasing mar-
ket. In line with the Granger causality results obtained previously,
selling market price changes do not seem to depend on past leasing
market price changes (u21 = 0). Both leasing and selling market
price changes are moderately persistent with the autoregressive
coefﬁcients being positive. The modulus of both roots is less than
unity so we have a stable equilibrium point (stable node; see Case
1 in Section 3). Since both roots are real and distinct, shocks will
dissipate in a monotone rather than ﬂuctuating manner. The
explanatory power of the VAR equations is satisfactory given that
we are predicting monthly changes in the variables over a relatively
long time period using a parsimonious speciﬁcation. Although it is
beyond the scope of this paper, explanatory power could be
enhanced by including additional variables related to, for example,
income, inﬂation and interest rate levels, currency rates, oil prices,
consumer sentiment, etc.6 The discrete form of the general model (5) is given in Appendix D. The stability
conditions for the general model are given as in the symmetric case by the roots of the
system. There are conditions relating the matrix coefﬁcients with the roots of the
system and its stability, the Routh-Hurwitz conditions (see Gandolfo, 2005, pp. 251–
258).
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The standard framework of lease valuation (Myers et al., 1976)
adopts discounted cash ﬂow analysis to derive the equilibrium ren-
tal rate7:
PL;t ¼ PL;0 
Xn
t¼1
Lt
ð1þ qÞn 
RVn
ð1þ qÞn ð10Þ
where RVn is the expected residual value of the asset in period n. By
employing a uniform lease payment we obtain the Myers, Dill and
Bautista (MDB) formula:
LðtÞ ¼ q
1 ð1þ qÞn PL;0  PL;t 
RVn
ð1þ qÞn
 
or, equivalently, the lease rate:
LðtÞ
PLðtÞ ¼
q
ð1þ qÞn  1 1
PL;0
PL;t
þ RVn
PL;tð1þ qÞn
 
ð11Þ
Given our model and empirical results, an obvious shortcoming of
this valuation approach is that it treats the leasing market autono-
mously and ignores any interactions with the selling market. The
remainder of this section will incorporate our ﬁndings concerning
the interaction between the leasing and selling markets in the
MBD valuation approach.
From (9) we can derive the motion for the system of lease and
sell rates from the following complementary function:
RL;t ¼ A1bt1 þ A2bt2
Rk;t ¼ B1bt1 þ B2bt2
ð12Þ
where
B1  A1 b1b11u12
B2  A2 b2b11u12
ð13Þ
Moreover, since b1  b11 = 0, we obtain:
RL;t ¼ A1bt1 þ A2bt2
Rk;t ¼ B2bt2
The arbitrary constants Ai are determined by the initial conditions
of the system as follows:
A2 ¼ Rk0u12b2b11
RL;0 ¼ A1 þ A2
ð14Þ
where RL,0 and Rk,0 have already been deﬁned as RL;0 ¼ DPLPL;1 ¼
PL;0PL;1
PL;1
and Rk;0 ¼ DPkPk;1 ¼
Pk;0Pk;1
Pk;1
. So, having estimated RL,t and Rk,t, we can
obtain PL,t and Pk,t as:bPL;t ¼ PL;t1ð1þ bRL;tÞ ¼ PL;t1ð1þ A1bt1 þ A2bt2ÞbPk;t ¼ Pk;t1ð1þ bRk;tÞ ¼ Pk;t1ð1þ B2bt2Þ ð15Þ
Now, the following quantity:
Gt ¼ PL;t  bPL;t ¼ PL;t  PL;t1ð1þ bRL;tÞ
¼ PL;t  PL;t1ð1þ A1bt1 þ A2bt2Þ ð16Þ7 An alternative is the user cost theory approach of Miller and Upton (1976). A
number of other valuation models have been proposed in order to account for credit
risk in lease contracts (see, for example, Grenadier, 1996; Ambrose and Yildirim,
2008; Agarwal et al., 2011) or for various optionalities in leasing contracts (see, for
example, McConnell and Schallheim, 1983; Schallheim and McConnell, 1985;
Grenadier, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1996). For empirical applications see Schallheim et al.
(1987), and, Giaccotto et al. (2007). A relevant literature deals with leasing of other
real assets (e.g. see the theoretical framework and empirical analysis by Golbeck and
Linetsky (2013)).represents a capital gain or loss which results from the interaction
between the leasing and selling markets and could be used to aug-
ment the MBD leasing valuation formula. In other words, this term
reﬂects an opportunity cost in the sense that the price of the leased
asset changes and this is something that should be accounted for.
Another reasonable adjustment that should be made concerns the
residual value since this is an expectation of the stochastic value
which the asset will have in the termination of the contract (e.g.,
Trigeorgis, 1996, assumes that the residual value follows an Orn-
stein–Uhlenbeck process). The residual value is corrected here on
the basis of the interaction with the selling market by using the
cumulative changes in the leasing market prices
Qn
t¼1ð1þ bRL;tÞ.
Finally, the overall effect of the interaction with the selling market
can be captured by the following augmented lease valuation
formula:
PL;t ¼ PL;0 
Xn
t¼1
Lt
ð1þ qÞn 
RVn
Qn
t¼1ð1þ bRL;tÞ
ð1þ qÞn 
Xn
t¼1
ct
ð1þ qÞn ð17Þ4.3. A numerical example
We shall use a hypothetical example in order to illustrate the
application and practical importance for valuation of the interac-
tion between leasing and selling markets. Assume that we are con-
sidering the valuation of a contract for a car with a base price
PL,0 = $30,000 which will be leased over a 6 month period with a
terminal residual value RVn equal to $25,000 (83.3% of the base
price). Lease payments are due at the end of each month and the
lease is ﬁnanced at a monthly rate of q = 1%.
Without taking into account the interaction between the two
markets, the traditional MDB formula described in (11) gives a
monthly lease payment L(t) equal to $1112.74. Assume also that
we are at October 2009 when the US selling market price level
increased by Rk,t = 1.535% compared to the previous month (as
shown in Fig. 1). We can use this information to recursively predict
lease rates and prices using Eq. (15) over the next 6 months on the
basis of the VAR model parameters estimated previously using US
data. The predicted lease rates are bRL;tþ1 ¼ 0:86971%, 0.49903%,
0.23897%, 0.10575%, 0.04489% and 0.01861%, respectively,
for t = 1–6 months. This corresponds to a total compound
(average) expected drop of 1.77% (0.3%). These predictions are
close to the actual rates of RL,t+i = 0.27942%, 1.12581%,
0.19465%, 1.10043%, 0.28486% and 1.84133%, respectively,
for t = 1–6 months. These changes corresponded to a total
compound (average) change of 2.61% (0.44%).
If we use these values in the augmented MDB formula described
in (17) then we obtain a monthly lease payment L(t) of $1505.64Fig. 1. Automobile selling prices (NEW) and leasing prices (LEAS).
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standard MDB formula is used and the predictions of lease rates
from our estimated model are realized then the lessor will under-
price the lease payment. This translates into a negative monthly
internal rate of return of 1.21% (instead of a positive 1%) which
corresponds to an annual loss of 13.61% (instead of a 12.68%
proﬁt, i.e. the compounded return of 1% for 12 months). Using
the actual rather than predicted lease rates gives an ex post fair
monthly payment L(t) of $1578.70 which is close to the estimate
from the augmented MDB model. These calculations suggest that
our results have signiﬁcant practical implication for pricing leasing
contracts.
5. Conclusions
This paper describes a novel theoretical framework which leads
to an interactive relationship between leasing and selling markets
for automobiles. This framework extends previous approaches by
allowing forward-looking ﬁrms which are set in an oligopoly while
leasing and selling are not assumed to be perfect substitutes. The
simplest speciﬁcation justiﬁed is a VAR(1) model of lease and sell
rates, which is estimated using monthly US data. Results conﬁrm
a one-way interacting relationship whereby sell rates Granger-
cause lease rates. We show how this interaction can be incorpo-
rated within standard lease pricing formulas. A numerical example
demonstrates that our ﬁndings have non-trivial practical implica-
tions for lease pricing.
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Appendix A. Proof of proposition
We describe the general conditions that the rate functions must
satisfy for the calculus of variations technique to be valid. We also
provide a detailed derivation of the ﬁrst-order optimization
conditions.
The representative lessor faces the intertemporal problem (1)
that we reproduce here for the convenience of the reader:
max
RLI ðtÞ
Z 1
0
eqtðRLI ðtÞ  cLI ÞqLI ðtÞdt
By setting the integrand equal to a function F we have:
F  eqtðRLI ðtÞ  cLI ÞqLI ðtÞ
Then, the Euler equation for dynamic optimization is:
FRLI ¼ F _RLI þ F _RLI _RLI
_RLI þ F _RLI _RLI
€RLI
The second and third term on the right hand side of the above Euler
equation are zero and by calculating the derivative on the left hand
side and the ﬁrst time derivative on the right hand side of the above
Euler equation we get part (a) of our proposition, which gives rep-
resentative lessor’s i Euler equation. The representative seller faces
the intertemporal problem (2) which is symmetrical to the problem
of the representative lessor. So, the steps that we have to follow in
order to ﬁnd the Euler equation of the representative seller are the
same as described previously.
Now we can follow the following steps in order to write the ﬁrst
order conditions of the optimization problems in matrix form.First, we take the Euler equations for the representative lessor
and the representative seller:
qLi ðtÞ þ ðRLi ðtÞ  cLi ÞhLi ¼ qðRLi ðtÞ  cLi Þh _Li ; 8i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n
qkj ðtÞ þ ðRkj ðtÞ  ckj Þkkj ¼ qðRkj ðtÞ  ckj Þk _kj ; 8j ¼ 1;2; . . . ;m
We substitute the demand functions with their equals and
q ¼ cLi ¼ ckj :
ð2hLi þ qh _Li ÞRLi ðtÞ þ hLi RLi ðtÞ þ hkjRkj ðtÞ þ hkj Rkj ðtÞ
þ h _Li _RLi ðtÞ þ h _Li _RLi ðtÞ þ h _kj _Rkj ðtÞ þ h _kj _Rkj ðtÞ
¼ ðhLi þ qh _Li Þq h0 ðA:1Þ
ð2kkj þ qk _kj ÞRkj ðtÞ þ kLiRLi ðtÞ þ kLi RLi ðtÞ þ kkj Rkj ðtÞ
þ k _Li _RLi ðtÞ þ k _Li _RLi ðtÞ þ k _kj _Rkj ðtÞ þ k _kj _Rkj ðtÞ
¼ ðkkj þ qk _kj Þq k0 ðA:2Þ
We write the above equations for every i and j, and, get the follow-
ing system of equations:
h _L1
_RL1 ðtÞ þ h _L2 _RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ h _Ln _RLnðtÞ þ h _k1 _Rk1 ðtÞ þ h _k2 _Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .
þh _km _Rkm ðtÞ þ ð2h _L1 þ qh _L1 ÞRL1 ðtÞ þ h _L2RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ h _LnRLn ðtÞ
þh _k1Rk1 ðtÞ þ h _k2Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ h _kmRkm ðtÞ ¼ ðh _L1 þ qh _L1 Þq h0
..
.
h _L1
_RL1 ðtÞ þ h _L2 _RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ h _Ln _RLnðtÞ þ h _k1 _Rk1 ðtÞ þ h _k2 _Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .
þh _km _Rkm ðtÞ þ h _L1RL1 ðtÞ þ h _L2RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ ð2h _Ln þ qh _LnÞRLnðtÞ
þh _k1Rk1 ðtÞ þ h _k2Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ h _kmRkm ðtÞ ¼ ðh _Ln þ qh _Ln Þq h0
..
.
k _k1
_Rk1 ðtÞ þ k _k2 _Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ k _km _Rkm ðtÞ þ k _L1 _RL1 ðtÞ
þk _L2 _RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ k _Ln _RLn ðtÞ
þð2kk1 þ qk _k1 ÞRk1 ðtÞ þ kk2Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ kkmRkm ðtÞ þ kL1RL1 ðtÞ
þkL2RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ kLnRLnðtÞ ¼ ðkk1 þ qk _k1 Þq k0
..
.
k _k1
_Rk1 ðtÞ þ k _k2 _Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ k _km _Rkm ðtÞ þ k _L1 _RL1 ðtÞ þ k _L2 _RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .
þk _Ln _RLn ðtÞ þ kk1Rk1 ðtÞ þ kk2Rk2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ ð2kkm þ qk _km ÞRkm ðtÞ
þkL1RL1 ðtÞ þ kL2RL2 ðtÞ þ . . .þ kLnRLn ðtÞ ¼ ðkkm þ qk _km Þq k0
ðA:3Þ
We divide the ﬁrst n equations by h _Li and the followingm equations
by k _kj to obtain the system (5).Appendix B. Detailed derivation of the symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium all leasing ﬁrms charge the same
rate and all the selling ﬁrms do as well. In this case lessor’s i and
seller’s j Euler equations become:
ð2hL þ qh _LÞRLðtÞ þ ðn 1ÞhLRLðtÞ þ hkRkðtÞ þ ðm 1ÞhkRkðtÞ
þ h _L _RLðtÞ þ h _k _RkðtÞ þ ðn 1Þh _L _RLðtÞ þ ðm 1Þh _k _RkðtÞ
¼ ðhL þ qh _LÞq h0 ðB:1Þ
ð2kk þ qk _kÞRkðtÞ þ ðn 1ÞkLRLðtÞ þ kLRLðtÞ þ ðm 1ÞkkRkðtÞ
þ k _L _RLðtÞ þ k _k _RkðtÞ þ ðn 1Þk _L _RLðtÞ þ ðm 1Þk _k _RkðtÞ
¼ ðkk þ qk _kÞq k0 ðB:2Þ
A. Andrikopoulos, R.N. Markellos / Journal of Banking & Finance 50 (2015) 260–270 269Dividing Eq. (B.1) by nh _L and Eq. (B.2) by mk _k, we get the ﬁrst order
conditions of the optimization problems, in matrix form, and the
coefﬁcients in equation (7) of the main text.
Appendix C. Explicit solution of system of differential equations
in normal form
In this Appendix is given the explicit solution of Eq. (7). In
matrix form, Eq. (7) can be written as:
_RLðtÞ
_RkðtÞ
" #
¼ u11u12
u21u22
 
RLðtÞ
RkðtÞ
 
þ K1
K2
 
The solution of the above non-homogeneous system of differential
equations can be obtained by adding to the solution of the corre-
sponding homogeneous system (complementary function) the par-
ticular solution. So, the solution of the above system can be found
by following three steps. Firstly, we ﬁnd the complementary func-
tion. Secondly, we ﬁnd the particular solution and thirdly we ﬁnd
the arbitrary constants for a given set of initial conditions. Finally
we compose the above three steps.
The characteristic polynomial of the system’s matrix
U  u11 u12u21 u22
 
can be written as u2  (u11 + u22)u + (u11
u22  u12u21) = 0.
The above characteristic polynomial may have three different
types of roots.
C.1. Distinct real roots, when D = tr(U)2  4 det (U) > 0
If the roots of the system are real and distinct
u1;2 ¼ 12 trðUÞ  12
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
trðUÞ2  4detðUÞ
q 
then the general solution
of the system is:
RLðtÞ ¼ u12u1 u2
Rk0 u2 u11u1 u2
RL0
 
eu1t
þ u1  2u2 u11
u1 u2
Rk0  u12u1 u2
RL0
 
eu2t
þ K2u21  K1u22
u11u22 u12u21
ðC:1Þ
RkðtÞ ¼ u12u1 u2
Rk0 u2 u11u1 u2
RL0
 
u1 u11
u12
eu1t
þ u1  2u2 u11
u1 u2
Rk0  u12u1 u2
RL0
 
u2 u11
u12
eu2t
þ K1u21  K2u11
u11u22 u12u21C.2. Repeated real roots, when D = tr(U)2  4 det (U) = 0
If the roots of the system are real and equal ðu1;2 ¼ u ¼ 12 trðUÞÞ
then the general solution of the system is:
RLðtÞ ¼ RL0 þu12Rk0t  u22u112 RL0t
 
eut þ K2u21K1u22u11u22u12u21
RkðtÞ ¼ Rk0 þ u22u112 Rk0t  ðu22u11Þ
2
4u12
RL0t
h i
eut þ K1u21K2u11u11u22u12u21
ðC:2ÞC.3. Complex conjugate roots, when D = tr(U)2  4 det (U) < 0
Finally, if the roots of the system are complex conjugates
(u1;2 ¼ 12 trðUÞ  12 i
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4detðUÞ  trðUÞ2
q
¼ a ih, where a ¼ 12 trðUÞand h ¼ 12
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4detðUÞ  trðUÞ2
q
), then the general solution of the sys-
tem is:
RkðtÞ ¼ eat Rk0 cosðhtÞ þ u12h Rk0  au11h RL0
	 

sinðhtÞ þ K2u21K1u22u11u22u12u21
RkðtÞ ¼ eat Rk0 ðtÞ cosðhtÞ
h
þ au11h Rk0  ðau11Þ
2
hu12
RL0 þ hu12 RL0
h i
sinðhtÞ
i
þ K1u21K2u11u11u22u12u21
ðC:3Þ
For a more systematic treatment of Simultaneous Systems of Differ-
ential Equations see Gandolfo (2005, pp. 237–245).Appendix D. Discrete form of the general model
We present the discrete form of the general model (5) which is a
n +m variable VAR model of lag order one:
RL1;tþ1
..
.
RLn;tþ1
Rk1;tþ1
..
.
Rkm;tþ1
2666666666664
3777777777775
¼
1þ l1;1 . . . l1;nþm
..
. . .
. ..
.
lnþm;1 . . . 1þ lnþm;nþm
2664
3775
RL1;t
..
.
RLn;t
Rk1;t
..
.
Rkm;t
2666666666664
3777777777775
þ
M1
..
.
Mn
Mnþ1
..
.
Mnþm
266666666664
377777777775References
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